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Abstract—One prominent security threat that targets un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is the capture via GPS spoofing
in which an attacker manipulates a UAV’s global positioning
system (GPS) signals in order to capture it. Given the anticipated
widespread deployment of UAVs for various purposes, it is imper-
ative to develop new security solutions against such attacks. In
this paper, a mathematical framework is introduced for analyzing
and mitigating the effects of GPS spoofing attacks on UAVs. In
particular, system dynamics are used to model the optimal routes
that the UAVs will adopt to reach their destinations. The GPS
spoofer’s effect on each UAV’s route is also captured by the
model. To this end, the spoofer’s optimal imposed locations on
the UAVs, are analytically derived; allowing the UAVs to predict
their traveling routes under attack. Then, a countermeasure
mechanism is developed to mitigate the effect of the GPS spoofing
attack. The countermeasure is built on the premise of cooperative
localization, in which a UAV can determine its location using
nearby UAVs instead of the possibly compromised GPS locations.
To better utilize the proposed defense mechanism, a dynamic
Stackelberg game is formulated to model the interactions between
a GPS spoofer and a drone operator. In particular, the drone
operator acts as the leader that determines its optimal strategy in
light of the spoofer’s expected response strategy. The equilibrium
strategies of the game are then analytically characterized and
studied through a novel proposed algorithm. Simulation results
show that, when combined with the Stackelberg strategies, the
proposed defense mechanism will outperform baseline strategy
selection techniques in terms of reducing the possibility of UAV
capture.
Index Terms—Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), GPS spoof-
ing, game theory, dynamic Stackelberg equilibrium, cooperative
localization
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), popularly known as
drones, have been recently adopted in many Internet of Things
(IoT) systems to provide services such as telecommunications,
delivery, surveillance, and medical services [1]–[7]. Due to
their ability to hover and their high-mobility capability without
being restricted to specific routes, UAVs can provide services
in hard-to-reach locations such as natural disaster sites. Con-
sidering their ease of deployment, UAVs can play a major rule
in time-critical systems [8] and to provide urgent Internet and
communication services when necessary [9] and [10].
However, the widespread use of UAVs in different applica-
tions exposes them to a plethora of security threats that include
cyber, physical, and cyber-physical attacks [11]. Examples
include cyber attacks such as, false data injection [12] and
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physical attacks such as targeting the UAVs using firearms
or hunting rifles. Cyber-physical attacks, on the other hand,
represent a category of sophisticated attacks that aim at caus-
ing both cyber and physical damage to the UAV such as GPS
spoofing, GPS jamming, hijacking the connection between a
UAV and its controller, and thwarting delivery drones [13].
Among these attacks, GPS spoofing is seen as one of the
most imminent threats as it is practical and can be easily
performed against UAVs [14]. In GPS spoofing attacks, an
attacker transmits fake GPS signals to a UAV with slightly
higher power than the authentic GPS signals, so as to mislead
the UAV into thinking it is in another location. Hence, the
attacker can use this technique to send the UAV to another,
predetermined, location where it can be captured, thus exe-
cuting a capture via GPS spoofing attack [15]. The authors
in [15] discussed two types of GPS spoofing attacks known as
covert and overt attacks. In a covert attack, the attacker wants
to avoid triggering some spoofing detection techniques such
as jamming-to-noise ratio and frequency unlock monitoring
within the GPS receiver. This requires the attacker to be
capable of accurately monitoring the target UAV and to trans-
mit its spoofing signals with specific powers and frequencies.
The attacker may also be forced to limit the changes it can
impose on a UAV. In contrast, in an overt attack, the attacker
can impose any location on the UAV with the risk of being
detected.
A. Related Works
Different techniques have been proposed in literature to
defend against GPS spoofing attacks with a focus on attack
detection [16]–[20]. In [16], different techniques are discussed
that can enable a UAV’s receiver to detect the spoofing attacks.
This includes allowing the receiver to observe the received
signal strength and compare it to the expected signal strength
over time. It can also monitor the identification codes of GPS
satellites or keep checking the time intervals to see if they
are constant. While these techniques can help to detect basic
attackers, they fail against sophisticated attacks in which the
attacker monitors the target object accurately [17]. In [18], the
authors proposed a method to detect GPS spoofing attacks by
using two GPS receivers and checking their cross-correlations.
This method was tested against several spoofing attacks and
was shown to successfully detect attacks, however, it has
low probability of differentiating spoofed from authentic GPS
signals and cannot detect the spoofing when the signals are
weak.
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Other techniques to thwart GPS spoofing such as receiver
autonomous integrity monitoring, signal to interference ratio,
Doppler shift detection are discussed in [19]. However, all of
these techniques can be avoided by highly capable adversaries
that can carefully generate GPS counterfeit signals to avoid
triggering these detection schemes. In [21], automatic gain
control is used within the GPS receiver to detect and flag po-
tential spoofing attacks within a low computational complexity
framework. Finally, the work in [20] proposed a technique that
allows UAVs to detect GPS spoofers by using an independent
ground infrastructure that continuously analyzes the contents
and times of arrival of the estimated UAV positions. The
proposed technique was shown to be effective in detecting the
spoofing attacks in less than two seconds and to determine the
spoofer’s location after 15 minutes of monitoring time, with
an accuracy of up 150 meters.
Other works in literature have studied the use of multiple
receivers to detect GPS spoofing attacks such as in [22]–
[24]. In [22], the authors demonstrated the ability of using
a dual antenna receiver in detecting GPS spoofing attacks.
Their proposed technique depends on observing the carrier
differences between the different antennas referenced to the
same oscillator. Under the proposed configuration, an attacker
will need to use an additional transmitting antenna for every
additional receiver antenna which complicates the attacker’s
mission. In [23], multiple independent GPS receivers were
used to detect GPS spoofing attacks. The proposed technique
depends on fixing the distances between the receivers and then
measuring the distances between the receivers’ reported loca-
tions. Under authentic GPS signals, the measured distances
will be similar to the previously fixed distances. However,
under a GPS spoofing attack, the measured distances will be
very close to zero, as all the receivers are spoofed with the
same fake location. Finally, in [24], multiple receivers were
used to authenticate the GPS signals based on the correlation
with the military GPS signal, without the need to decrypt
it. Among these receivers, one GPS receiver uses the other
receivers, referred to as cross-check receivers, to determine
whether its GPS signals are authentic. The proposed technique
was shown to be effective even when the cross-check receivers
are spoofed with some probability. The technique was tested
with stationary and moving GPS receivers and was shown to
effectively detect the spoofing attacks.
However, one limitation of these existing GPS spoofing
detection techniques, i.e. [16]–[24], is that they do not provide
an approach to determine the real location of the UAV, after
detecting the attack. Thus, if a UAV is attacked while following
a route towards a specific destination, the best it can do is
to recognize the attack and to stop using the altered GPS
signals. However, the UAV will not be able to determine its
real location, and, hence, it will not resume its motion towards
the specified destination. Indeed, these prior works are mostly
focused on detection techniques and do not provide any attack
mitigation or defense mechanisms (beyond discarding GPS
signals altogether).
B. Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is, thus, a general
framework for UAVs to mitigate the effect of capture attacks
via GPS spoofing. Unlike the prior works [16]–[21], our
framework can both allow the UAVs to detect the GPS
spoofing attacks and to determine their real locations. This
will enable the UAVs to avoid being captured and to resume
their previous routes and fulfill their missions.
In the proposed framework, we use system dynamics [25]
to model a UAV’s motion between its origin and destination.
For this model, we derive the optimal UAV’s controller that
allows UAV to travel on the shortest path between any given
two locations. This model also captures the effect of a GPS
spoofer’s on the UAV’s traveling path. In particular, we ana-
lytically derive the optimal location, under covert attack, that a
GPS spoofer can impose on a UAV to lead it to the attacker’s
desired destination where it can be physically captured. We,
then, introduce a defense mechanism built on the technique of
cooperative localization [26], which enables a UAV, traveling
within a group of proximate UAVs, to determine its location
using the real locations of neighboring UAVs and their relative
distances. The mechanism also allows the identification of
which UAV is being attacked.
Subsequently, we model the interactions between a GPS
spoofer and a group of UAVs using game theory [27]. In
particular, we formulate a dynamic Stackelberg game in which
the drone operator is the leader that selects its strategy first,
and then, the spoofer responds by selecting its strategy. A
strategy, here, represents a set of actions taken over all the time
steps. We, then, propose an efficient technique to solve the
formulated dynamic Stackelberg game. Using this technique,
we analytically derive the Stackelberg strategies for the game.
Finally, through simulations, we show that drone operator can
effectively use the proposed defense mechanism to protect the
UAVs from being captured and minimize the attacker’s effect
on the UAVs’ optimal routes.
In summary, our contributions include
• We propose a general framework, using realistic system
dynamics, to model a UAV’s traveling path between any
two locations. This model takes into account the effect
of a possible GPS spoofer on the UAV’s traveling path.
• We analytically derive the attacker’s optimal imposed
location, on a UAV. This imposed location ensures that
attack remains covert while maximizing the attacker’s
benefit from imposing a different location on the UAV.
• We propose a new defense mechanism built on the
technique of cooperative localization to help UAVs to
determine their real location, under GPS spoofing attack,
using neighbor UAVs’ real locations and their relevant
distances.
• We then formulate a dynamic Stackelberg game to model
the interaction between the drone operator and the GPS
spoofer. This game formulation allows the drone operator
to effectively use the proposed defense mechanism.
• We introduce a novel computationally-efficient approach
to solve the formulated game and we analytically derive
the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies for the game.
• We show, through simulations, that the derived Stackel-
berg strategies outperform other strategy selection tech-
niques by reducing the UAVs possibility of being cap-
tured. The defense mechanism is also shown to mitigate
the effects of GPS spoofing attacks on the UAVs’ deflec-
tions from their planned routes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The UAV’s
system dynamics model is presented in Section II. The at-
tacker’s model and the optimal imposed locations are derived
in Section III. The proposed defense mechanism and the
Stackelberg dynamic game with its equilibrium solutions are
formulated in Section IV. Numerical results are presented
and analyzed in Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a set N of N UAVs performing a common mis-
sion, e.g., a drone delivery system responsible for delivering
goods within a certain geographic area. Each UAV is typically
equipped with a GPS receiver, a means of wireless communi-
cation, and other application-specific sensors. As it was shown
in [28], a GPS spoofing attack cannot affect the altitude of
UAVs and, thus, we use a two-dimensional (2D) coordination
system to specify their locations. Let the location of UAV i at
time t be xi(t) = [xi(t), yi(t)]
T , where i ∈ N . Similarly, the
source locations, Oi, will be given as xOi = [xOi , yOi ]
T , and
each destination’s location is xdi = [xdi , ydi ]
T . Destinations
are assumed to be fixed and not time dependent. The goal of
each UAV is to minimize the transportation cost and, hence,
it chooses the shortest path from its source Oi towards its
destination di.
In our model, we consider an adversary located along the
traveling paths of the UAVs whose goal is to spoof the GPS
signals of any of the UAVs in order to send it to another
location where it can be captured. We consider a capable
GPS spoofer that can spoof from a distance (in the order of
hundreds of meters) without the need to be co-located with
the UAV’s GPS receiver [15].
Prior to developing the threat model, we first use system
dynamics to model the UAV’s motion between its source
location, the origin, and destination. This model is needed
to better understand the impact of the attack on the UAV’s
mobility. In order for each UAV to minimize its travel time,
each UAV will follow the shortest path between its current
location and its destination which essentially consists of the
straight line connecting the two locations in 2D space. Let
the location of UAV i after a time duration ∆ be xi(t+ ∆).
Let vi(t) = [vxi(t), vyi(t)]
T be the UAV’s velocity at the
beginning of time step t. The UAV’s velocity at the end of the
time step can be represented in terms of the UAV’s acceleration
as follows:
vi(t+ ∆) = vi(t) + ∆ · gi(t), (1)
UAV
Destination
Fig. 1: UAV traveling model between two locations.
where gi(t) = [gxi(t), gyi(t)]
T is the acceleration of UAV i
during the time step starting at t with a duration T .
The next location can then be represented using both the
velocity and acceleration as follows:
xi(t+ ∆) = xi(t) + ∆ · vi(t) + ∆
2
2
· gi(t). (2)
Since the force needed to move the UAV between two
locations is proportional to both the UAV’s acceleration and
weight, and the UAV’s weight is constant, this force can
then be related directly to the acceleration [29]. Let ui(t) =
[uxi(t), uyi(t)]
T be the force needed to move the UAV be-
tween any two locations. This force will be proportional to the
distance difference between the current and the next locations,
i.e., the UAV must accelerate more in the direction with a
larger distance difference. Fig. 1 shows the UAV’s traveling
model with the force components in each direction. In Fig. 1,
the distance difference in the x direction is more than the
difference in the y direction, and, hence, the force component
in the x direction will be greater than that of the y direction.
In order for each UAV to minimize its travel time, each
UAV will need to find the optimal force to move between any
two locations given that the maximum allowable force is umax.
Let φi be the angle between the UAV movement route and the
positive x direction which can be calculated as:
φi(t) = arctan
( ydi − yi(t)
xdi − xi(t)
)
= arctan(γ). (3)
The force components in both x and y directions can then
be given by:
u∗xi(t) = u
max · cos(φi(t)),
u∗yi(t) = u
max · sin(φi(t)). (4)
These values represent the optimal controller, i.e., the opti-
mal force that each UAV can use to move between any two
locations. Note that, if γ > 1 then sin(φi(t)) > cos(φi(t))
and in this case u∗yi(t) > u
∗
xi(t), and vice verse. Substitute
the optimal controller into (2), the UAV’s next location can
then be given, in terms of the optimal controller, as:
xi(t+ ∆) = xi(t) + ∆ · vxi(t) + c ·∆2 · u∗xi(t),
yi(t+ ∆) = yi(t) + ∆ · vyi(t) + c ·∆2 · u∗yi(t), (5)
where c = m2 is a constant and m is the UAV’s weight. Next
we will discuss the effect of a GPS spoofer on the UAV’s
route by deriving both the optimal locations for an attacker to
impose on a UAV and the manipulated routes under attack.
III. UAV TRAVELING MODEL UNDER GPS SPOOFING
ATTACK
In our model, the GPS spoofer seeks to take control of the
UAV’s GPS antennas and then transmit tailored GPS signals to
convince the UAV’s navigation system that it is in a different
location. The spoofer can perform either an overt attack or
a covert attack. In the overt attack, the spoofer makes no
effort to hide its attack, it transmits its fake signals with higher
power than the authentic GPS signals. The covert attack, on
the other hand, requires an accurate tracking of the target UAV
and the transmission of fake GPS signals with specific power
requirements to avoid being immediately detected by the UAV.
Here, we consider a spoofer that wants to keep its attack covert
by adjusting the transmission power of the counterfeit GPS
signals to avoid being detected. Practical values for such power
requirements can be found in [15]. In addition, the attacker will
be limited to the changes it can impose on the UAV’s location,
each time, so that these imposed locations do not trigger the
fault detectors within the UAV [28]. The distance between the
current and imposed location is known as the instance drifted
distance [30].
Let emax be the instance drifted distance that limits the
spoofer’s attack. Let xˆi(t) = [xˆi(t), yˆi(t)]
T be the attacker’s
imposed location on UAV i. Let Ei(t) = [exi(t), eyi(t)]
T
be a vector whose individual elements represent the distance
difference between the UAV’s actual location and the attacker’s
imposed location. Then, we must have:
‖Ei(t)‖2 = ‖xi(t)− xˆi(t)‖2 ≤ emax, (6)
which represents a circle of radius emax around the UAV’s
current location.
Note that, imposing an attacker-desired location on a UAV
does not actually change the UAV’s location, instead, it
changes the UAV’s belief about its location. This means that
the UAV will still be in its real location but its navigation
system will believe that it is in a different location. The UAV
will then need to find a new optimal controller, i.e., new force
components to move from its imposed location to its final
destination. In this case, there will be two routes as shown in
Fig. 2. Here, the upper route is the fake route which the UAV
believes it is traveling on. This route starts from the attacker’s
imposed location towards the UAV’s real destination. However,
the UAV will actually travel on the lower path towards the
attacker’s desired destination.
Let xadi = [x
a
di
, yadi ]
T be the attacker’s desired destination
for UAV i. The attacker’s imposed location, xˆi(t), at each
time step, needs to be calculated in order for the UAV to move
towards xadi . This can be achieved by satisfying the condition
in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The attacker’s imposed location needs to satisfy
γˆ = γa, where γˆ =
(
ydi−yˆi(t)
xdi−xˆi(t)
)
and γa =
(
yadi
−yi(t)
xadi
−xi(t)
)
.
Proof. Under an attack, the UAV will believe it is traveling
from the attacker’s imposed location, on the fake route in
Fig. 2. The attacker should then select this imposed location
UAV
Destination
Attacker’s desired   
destination
Actual route
Fake route
Fig. 2: UAV actual and fake routes.
[xˆi(t), yˆi(t)] such that the actual route leads the UAV to the
attacker’s desired destination. Since, the UAV travels on the
shortest path between any two locations, the actual route will
represent a straight line that is parallel to the route which the
UAV believes it is traveling on, i.e., the fake route.
From Fig. 2, the fake route, can be defined by the two points
[xˆi(t), yˆi(t)] and [xdi , ydi ]. Similarly, the actual route, can be
defined by the two points [xi(t), yi(t)] and [xadi , y
a
di
]. For these
routes to be parallel, the slopes of both routes need to be equal,
i.e., γˆ = γa. 
Note that, under overt attack, according to Lemma 1,
the attacker can impose, theoretically, any location on the
UAV that will lead the UAV to follow a path towards the
attacker’s desired destination. However, under a covert attack,
the imposed location will be limited by (6). This imposes
constraints on the attacker when choosing the imposed location
as there may be multiple or no points inside the circle, in
(6), that satisfy Lemma 1. When no such points exist, the
best option for the attacker is to force the UAV to move in a
direction as close as possible to the line connecting the real
location and the attacker’s desired destination, i.e., a direction
that minimizes the difference |γˆ − γa| in Lemma 1. If there
are more than one point that satisfy Lemma 1, then the best
for the attacker is to choose the furthest point from the UAV’s
real destination as this gives more flexibility for the attacker in
changing the imposed locations in the future time steps. Thus
the attacker’s optimal imposed location can be given by the
solution of the following constrained-optimization problem.
min
xai (t)
|γˆ − γa|, (7)
s. t. xai (t) = argmax
xai (t)
‖xdi − xai (t)‖2 ,
‖Ei(t)‖2 = ‖xi(t)− xai (t)‖2 ≤ emax.
In the following theorem, we analytically derive the at-
tacker’s imposed location, under covert attack.
Theorem 1. Let si(t) , (di(t) + ai(t) + li)(di(t) + ai(t) −
li)(di(t)− ai(t) + li)(ai(t) + li − di(t)) where
di(t) ,
√
(xi(t)− xdi)2 + (yi(t)− ydi)2, (8)
ai(t) ,
√
(xi(t)− xadi)2 + (yi(t)− yadi)2, (9)
li ,
√
(xadi − xdi)2 + (yadi − ydi)2. (10)
Then, the attacker’s imposed location is the solution for the
following set of equations:
yˆi(t)− ydi =
yˆi(t)− ydi
xˆi(t)− xdi
(xˆi(t)− xdi) (11)
(xi(t)− xˆi(t))2 + (yi(t)− yˆi(t))2 = e2max, (12)
if emax > 12ai(t)
√
si(t), or the following set of equations:
(xˆi(t)− xˆdi(t))2 + (xˆi(t)− yˆdi(t))2 = e2max + d2(t) (13)
(xi(t)− xˆi(t))2 + (yi(t)− yˆi(t))2 = e2max (14)
if emax ≤ 12ai(t)
√
si(t).
Proof. In Fig. 3, we use a geometrical representation for
the problem to help clarify our proof. Let La be the line
connecting the UAV’s real location to the attacker’s desired
destination. This line represents the attacker’s ideal route for
the UAV to travel on. Let Lp be the line parallel to La and
passes through the UAV’s real destination and ε be the distance
between these two lines. There are then two cases for line Lp.
Case 1: if the line Lp touches or intersects with the circle,
formed by the constraint, then the point or the set of points of
the intersection will represent a solution for the first objective
function. In this case, the difference |γa − γˆ| will be 0,
which is the minimum possible value. This case will happen
if emax ≥ ε. Thus, next, we find the value of ε using the
known values of di(t), ai(t), and li. To this end, we find
the area of triangle ADX , sADX(t), using two ways: 1)
sADX(t) =
ε·ai(t)
2 and 2) sADX(t) =
√
si(t)/4, using
Heron’s formula [31]. Hence, we will have ε = 12ai(t)
√
si(t).
Therefore, if emax ≥ 12ai(t)
√
si(t), then the attacker’s optimal
choice is the intersection of Lp with circle C where Lp can
be given by (11) and C can be given by (12).
As this intersection may consist of more than one point,
let S represents the solution set so far. The optimal solu-
tion for the problem in (7) can then be found by solving
the second optimization problem in the first constraint, i.e.,
xai (t) = argmaxxai (t) ‖xdi − xai (t)‖2 [32]. If S has only one
point, then this point will be the solution to the first constraint,
which is a point on the circle perimeter. However, if S has
multiple points, the solution will be the point on the circle’s
perimeter on the opposite side from the UAV’s real destination.
In either cases, this solution point will, then, be the attacker’s
imposed location.
Case 2: This case represents a more general case when
Lp does not intersect the circle formed by the constraint, i.e.,
emax >
1
2ai(t)
√
si(t). The solution to the objective function, in
this case, will not lie on Lp, instead it will lie on another line
L that passes through the UAV’s real destination and intersects
the circle at one point. This line L should make the smallest
angle α with the line Lp, and, hence, it minimizes the objective
function. Thus, the optimal imposed location by the attacker,
in this case, is the intersection of circle C and a circle C ′ with
a radius of
√
e2max + d
2
i (t) with its center at the actual desired
destination of the UAV. Circle C can be represented formally
as in (13). Note that the two circles will always intersect in two
Real destination
Attacker’s desired 
destination
(a) Case 1
Real destination
Attacker’s desired 
destination
(b) Case 2
Fig. 3: Determining the attacker’s imposed location.
points, however, only one of them will minimize the objective
function and, hence, this point will also be a solution for the
maximization problem in the first constraint. 
In the second case of Theorem 1, the attacker’s imposed
location will not lead the UAV directly to the attacker’s desired
destination. Consequently, the attacker might need to impose
more than one location on the UAV along its perceived route.
Each new imposed location can be calculated from Theorem
1 with respect to the UAV’s new location. Once the attacker
can lead the UAV towards its desired destination, the imposed
location, according to Theorem 1, will be the furthest point in
the circle that maintains the same direction. Next, we study
the UAV’s manipulated route due to the attacker’s imposed
location.
Consider the UAV’s next location under an attack. Similar
to (4), the UAV needs to compute the force components in
both directions. The UAV thinks it is at the attacker’s imposed
location, xˆi(t), so it calculates the required force to move
from xˆi(t) to its desired destination xdi . Let φ
a
i be the angle
between the x direction and the line connecting the UAV’s
imposed location to its real destination. The value of φai can
then be given as:
φa(t) = arctan
( ydi − yˆi(t)
xdi − xˆi(t)
)
= arctan(γˆ). (15)
Therefore, the force components in both x and y directions
can then be given as:
uaxi(t) = u
max · cos(φai (t)),
uayi(t) = u
max · sin(φai (t)). (16)
The UAV will then use the optimal controller in (16) to
move towards its real destination. However, the UAV will
actually move from its real location not its perceived location
as shown in Fig. 2. Let xai (t + 1) = [x
a
i (t + 1), y
a
i (t + 1)]
T
be the UAV’s next location under attack. It can then be given,
according to (5), as:
xai (t+ ∆) = xi(t) + ∆ · vxi(t) + c ·∆2 · uaxi(t),
yai (t+ ∆) = yi(t) + ∆ · vyi(t) + c ·∆2 · uayi(t). (17)
Note that, following the route calculated by (17) may
not guarantee the attacker to eventually lead the UAV to
the attacker’s desired destination. Achieving this depends on
multiple parameters such as the UAV’s current location and
the locations of its real destination and the attacker’s desired
destination. In general, the attacker should choose its desired
destination to satisfy the following condition.
Proposition 1. Under a covert attack, the attacker’s desired
destination should be located on the same side as the UAV’s
real destination, in terms of the direction with the largest
difference between the UAV’s current location and its real
destination.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix A. 
Next, we will discuss the defense mechanism against the
considered GPS spoofing attack.
IV. GPS SPOOFING COUNTERMEASURE
A. Defense Mechanism for Mitigating Spoofing Attacks
We propose a defense mechanism built on the concept
of cooperative localization [26] which is a framework that
enables a UAV to determine its real location in a 2D coor-
dinate system using the locations of three other UAVs. Each
UAV is assumed to have a means of measuring its relative
distances to the other, neighboring UAVs by inter-UAV range
measurements. In cooperative localization, a UAV chooses any
three neighboring UAVs, to update its location, given that the
selected UAVs are non-collinear. Following this, the UAV can
accurately determine its 2D location. While the cooperative
localization mechanism in [26] can help a UAV to determine
its location, it was proposed to be used in case of GPS signals
loss and cannot be used, directly, in case of GPS spoofing
attack due to the different nature of the problem.
Under a covert GPS spoofing attack, a UAV cannot trust
its GPS location nor the locations of other UAVs. Choosing
a neighboring UAV for the cooperative localization mecha-
nism will involve a risk as this UAV might itself be under
attack. To overcome this limitation, we propose a defense
mechanism based on the fact that a GPS spoofing attacker
can target only one UAV at a time, as discussed earlier. In
our proposed mechanism, a UAV will use the locations of
four neighboring UAVs, instead of three, to determine its real
location by identifying the UAV under attack and eliminating
it from the calculations. The proposed mechanism has the
same requirements of cooperative localization, i.e., the UAVs
are non-collinear, a UAV can request other UAVs’ locations
through inter-UAV communications, and each UAV needs to
be able to measure its relative distances to its neighboring
UAVs.
Due to the fact that determining a 2D location requires only
three UAVs, the fourth UAV will be used to check the results
as follows. A UAV will calculate its location using all the
permutations of three UAVs formed from the selected four
UAVs. Let any UAV and its selected four neighbor UAVs
represent a set given by F = {Fi}, where Fi represent a
UAV and i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. Assume UAV F1 wants to calculate
its location, let its location calculated from the GPS signals be
x˜1. The UAV, F1, cannot determine at this point if this location
is real or a spoofed location. The UAV will then calculate its
location four more times using all the groups formed of three
UAVs out of the selected four UAVS. For example, x˜2 can be
calculated using UAVs F2, F3, and F4, x˜3 can be calculated
using UAVs F2, F3, and F5, and so on for x˜4 and x˜5.
The UAV can then determine its real location according to
the following cases:
• If there is no attack, the value of x˜1 will equal all the
other values, i.e., x˜i, i = 2, . . . , 5, will all be the same.
• If UAV F1 is under attack, then all the values x˜i, i =
2, . . . , 5, will be equal but their value will not equal x˜1.
In this case, the real location of UAV F1 is the value
calculated from its neighboring UAVs.
• If another UAV, rather than UAV F1, is under attack, then
the value of x˜1 will equal only one of the four other
values. The other three values will be the same and the
UAV that contributed to calculating these values will be
the one under attack.
Note that the technique used in [24] was shown to require
four different cross-check receivers, to detect the GPS spoofing
attack, when 15% − 25% of the cross-check receivers are
unreliable. Comparing these findings to our proposed defense
mechanism, the same number of UAVs, i.e., four cross-check
receivers, will be required to detect a single attack, i.e., to
detect that 25% of the cross-check receivers are unreliable.
However, our defense mechanism is able to not only detect
attacks but to also determine the real locations.
Note that the proposed defense mechanism can similarly be
extended to the case in which more than one UAV is being
attacked simultaneously. The total number of UAVs and the
complexity of determining the real locations are discussed in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When n UAVs are being attacked simulta-
neously, a total of n + 4 UAVs, traveling in proximity, are
needed such that each UAV can determine its real location.
The complexity of finding the real location will be O(n+33 )
per UAV.
Proof. The case n = 1 has been discussed in details earlier
where four neighboring UAVs are required. Similarly, for the
case in which n > 1 UAVs are being attacked, four non-
attacked neighboring UAVs are still enough to determine the
real locations. In this case, if a UAV wants to determine its
location, it will start by calculating its location using its GPS
receivers and compare this location to the locations calculated
from all possible groups of three neighboring UAVs.
Calculate        using UAVs {      ,      ,      }
Start
Calculate       using GPS signals
The other three values will be wrong and 
the UAV that contributed to calculating 
these values is under attack. 
End
Calculate        using UAVs {      ,      ,      }
Calculate        using UAVs {      ,      ,      }
Calculate        using UAVs {      ,      ,      }
No attack
Yes
No
is under attack
Yes
No
different from 
all the other 
values?
Is
Are all 
values the same?
The value of       is correct and it will be 
equal to only one of the other values
Fig. 4: Flowchart for the defense mechanism.
Since n UAVs are under attack, there will be 4 UAVs
reporting their real locations. If these 4 UAVs include the
checking UAV, then its location, calculated from its GPS
receivers, will match the location calculated from the group
of the other 3 UAVs. This will represent the real location
of the checking UAV. On the other hand, if the 4 UAVs,
that are not attacked, do not include the checking UAV, then
the locations calculated from the groups formed of these 4
UAVs, i.e.,
(
4
3
)
= 4 groups will give the same (real) location
which will differ from the checking UAV’s own location. This
procedure will allow each checking UAV to determine whether
it is under attack, to determine its real location, and to identify
which UAVs are under attack.
The complexity of finding the real location depends on
the total number of the locations to be compared which
corresponds to the number of the groups formed from each 3
UAVs, i.e.,
(
(n+4)−1
3
)
=
(
n+3
3
)
, plus the UAV’s own location.
Therefore, the total number of calculations at each UAV will
be
(
n+3
3
)
+ 1, which results in a complexity of O(n+33 ). 
In Proposition 2, when the number of the attacked UAVs is
very large, the time complexity might affect the applicability
of the defense mechanism depending on the application. For
instance, in time-sensitive applications, where the UAVs need
to make rapid decisions, the increased number of calculations
may hinder the UAVs’ ability to determine their locations in
a timely manner. On the other hand, if the goal is to lead
the UAVs to their destinations without being constrained by
time-sensitive tasks, then, the UAVs can still apply the defense
mechanism even if the number of the attacked UAVs is large.
Finally, we summarize the basic case of our defense mech-
anism steps in the flow chart shown in Fig. 4. Note that,
following our approach in Fig. 4, a UAV can determine its real
location and identify which UAV is under attack. However, the
UAV under attack will have to also execute the same procedure
to determine its real location. One approach is to allow all the
UAVs to continuously use the proposed defense mechanism
along their travel paths. However, this might be challenging to
do in long routes as the energy consumption due to exchanging
communication messages, measuring distances to other UAVs,
and calculating the locations will be significant compared to
the UAVs’ limited power.
Given that a GPS spoofer can target only one UAV at a
time, we next propose a new approach to regulate the use
of our proposed defense mechanism among the UAVs through
studying the interactions between the GPS spoofer and a group
of UAVs, managed by their operator. The drone operator wants
to regulate the use of the defense mechanism, in an energy-
efficient manner, by determining when each UAV can use it
along its travel path, to avoid being captured. On the other
hand, the GPS spoofer wants to take control of the UAVs to
send them to other destinations where they can be captured.
In doing so, both the operator and the spoofer will be affected
by each others’ actions. Therefore, we propose to use game
theory [33] to model these interactions. In our game, the drone
operator is the defender and the GPS spoofer is the attacker.
As the attack and defense mechanisms are applied along each
UAV’s travel paths, the game will be time-depended, and,
hence, a dynamic game model is appropriate.
B. Dynamic Stackelberg Game Formulation
We formulate a dynamic game in which every player, i.e.,
the attacker and the defender chooses its actions at every time
step. Since the spoofer needs to monitor the targeted UAV to
generate tailored spoofing signals, the spoofer will be able to
attack only one UAV at any given time step. At each time, the
attacker can choose one action out of set Za which represents
the choice of one UAV to attack. Similarly, the drone operator
can choose one UAV to use the defense mechanism defined in
Section IV to update its location, given that the spoofer can
attack only one UAV at a time. Let Zd be the set from which
the defender is choosing its actions, i.e., a UAV to apply the
defense mechanism.
Note that, in the basic case of the proposed defense mecha-
nism, each UAV needs the locations of four neighboring UAVs
to determine its location. Therefore, each five UAVs can be
seen as a separate group in which one UAV is applying the
defense mechanism using the locations of the other four UAVs.
For other cases in which more than one UAV is being attacked,
the number of UAVs per group will be different. However,
these cases are beyond the scope of this work as each case
requires a separate analysis. In the following, we consider only
the basic case of the defense mechanism in which each five,
closely traveling, UAVs are considered to form a group that
is applying the defense mechanism locally within the group.
Hence, hereinafter, we consider a game in which the drone
operator is protecting only one group, because the solution can
be easily extended to the case of multiple groups of UAVs.
The actions of each player, when taken at a time step, will
affect the next locations of the UAVs. If a UAV is applying
the defense mechanism, then it can accurately determine its
location whether there is an attack or not. On the other
hand, if a UAV is dependent on the GPS signals, it will be
affected by the attacker’s actions and its next location will
depend on whether it is attacked or not. Here, we assume
that each spoofing attack is successful in that the attacker
will gain control of the UAV’s GPS receivers and impose its
desired location on the UAV’s GPS. Let zai (t), i = 1, . . . , 5
be a variable indicating whether the attacker has chosen to
attack UAV i, where zai (t) = 1 means the UAV i is being
attacked at time step t, and zai (t) = 0 otherwise. Similarly,
let zdi (t), i = 1, . . . , 5, be a variable indicating whether the
defender has chosen to protect UAV i, where zdi (t) = 1 means
the UAV i is applying, at time step t, the defense mechanism,
i.e., being protected, and zdi (t) = 0 otherwise. Each UAV’s
next location can then be given by:
xi(t+ ∆, z
d
i (t), z
a
i (t)) =z
d
i (t) · xi(t) +
(
1− zdi (t)
)[
zai (t)·
xai (t) + (1− zai (t)) · xi(t)
]
, (18)
where xi(t) and xai (t) are given by (5) and (17), respectively.
Equation (18) can be rearranged as:
xi(t+ ∆, z
d
i (t), z
a
i (t)) =
(
1− zai (t) + zai (t) · zdi (t)
)
· xi(t)
+
(
zai (t)− zai (t) · zdi (t)
)
· xai (t).
(19)
From Theorem 1, we can observe that the attacker’s imposed
location xai (t) can be accurately calculated from the UAV’s
current location xi(t), the UAV’s real destination, and the
attacker’s desired destination. However, as the UAV’s real
destination and the attacker’s desired destination are constants,
the attacker’s imposed location, at any given time step, can
be given as a function of the UAV’s real location. There-
fore, the location in (19) can be given as a function in
the UAV’s current location and both player’s actions, i.e.,
xi(t+ ∆, z
d
i (t), z
a
i (t)) = f
(
xi(t), z
d
i (t), z
a
i (t)
)
.
Next, we define the outcomes (utilities) for both players due
to their interactions. Since the objective for each player is to
move each UAV to its own desired destination, each player
will take actions to minimize the distance between the current
UAV’s location and the player’s desired destination. Thus, we
define the utility function for the attacker, at each time step,
as follows:
Ua(t, zdi (t), z
a
i (t)) =
5∑
i=1
∥∥xadi − xi(t+ ∆, zdi (t), zai (t))∥∥22 .
(20)
Similarly, the defender’s utility, at each time step, can be
given by:
Ud(t, zdi (t), z
a
i (t)) =
5∑
i=1
∥∥xdi − xi(t+ ∆, zdi (t), zai (t))∥∥22 .
(21)
Now, consider the players’ actions and utilities over all time
steps. Assume the maximum possible number of time steps is
τ , which is determined by the maximum time that any UAV
can travel based on its fuel or battery. This number is known
to the defender but the attacker does not need to know this
number. From Proposition 1, the GPS spoofer will not be able
to change the UAV’s direction and, thus, once a UAV passes
beyond the attacker’s desired destination, the attacker will no
more consider it when choosing its actions. Therefore, the
game is considered to end for the attacker when all the UAVs
pass beyond the attacker’s desired destinations.
Consider the players’ strategies which are defined as the
players’ actions taken at each time step t. Let βa be an
attacker’s strategy defined by βa = {zai (1), . . . , zai (τ)}, and
let A be the set of all the attacker’s possible strategies.
Similarly, let βd be a defender’s strategy defined by βd =
{zdi (1), . . . , zai (τ)}, and let D be the set of all the defender’s
possible strategies. The attacker’s accumulated utility will then
be:
Ja(βd,βa) =
τ∑
t=1
Ua(t∆, zdi (t), z
a
i (t))
=
τ∑
t=1
5∑
i=1
∥∥xadi − xi(t∆, zdi (t), zai (t))∥∥22 . (22)
Similarly, the defender’s accumulated utility will be given
by:
Jd(βd,βa) =
τ∑
t=1
Ud(t∆, zdi (t), z
a
i (t))
=
τ∑
t=1
5∑
i=1
∥∥xdi − xi(t∆, zdi (t), zai (t))∥∥22 . (23)
To solve this dynamic game, we propose to use the dynamic
Stackelberg game model [34]. In Stackelberg games, one
player, the leader, acts first by selecting its strategy and, then,
the other player, the follower, can respond by selecting its
strategy. In our game formulation, the drone operator will
act as the leader as it can choose which UAVs to protect
in advance and the attacker can observe this selection and
responds by choosing which UAVs to attack.
Now, we can formally formulate a dynamic Stackelberg
game Ξ described by the tuple
〈M,A,D, Ja, Jd, τ〉 where
M is the set of the two players: the defender and the attacker,
and the rest of the parameters as defined earlier. Based on
the utility functions, the game is non-zero sum. This means,
every player will try to minimize its utility and the sum of the
utilities will not equal zero. Moreover, each player seeks to
follow a strategy that minimizes its utility function given the
other player’s strategy. Next, we study our approach of finding
the optimal strategies, for each player, under the formulated
game.
C. Stackelberg Game Solution
The most commonly adopted solution for Stackelberg dy-
namic games is known as the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy
concept [34]. This solution is given by a pair of strategies
(βa∗,βd∗) defined as follows.
Definition 1. The Stackelberg equilibrium strategies, when the
defender is the leader, are derived as follow. Let r : D → A be
a mapping between the defender’s strategies and the attacker’s
strategies, such that:
Ja(βd, r(βd)) ≤ Ja(βd,βa),∀βa ∈ A, (24)
and the set:
Ra = {(βd,βa) ∈ D ×A : βa = r(βd),∀βd ∈ D}, (25)
is the reaction set for the attacker when the defender is the
leader. The Stackelberg equilibrium strategies (βa∗,βd∗) ∈
Ra of the game should then satisfy:
Jd(βa∗,βd∗) ≤ Jd(βd,βa),∀(βd,βa) ∈ Ra. (26)
Note that, solving for the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies
that satisfy (26) depends on the information available for each
player, at each time step [35]. According to [35], dynamic
games can be solved using open-loop strategies, closed-loop
strategies, or feedback strategies. In the formulated game,
each player selects a strategy that minimizes its utility which
involves taking actions, at each time step to control the UAVs’
locations. In doing so, both players can observe the initial
locations of the UAVs as well as their subsequent locations
up to the current time step. This type of information coincides
with the notion of closed-loop perfect information [35], and,
thus, we use closed-loop Stackelberg strategies to solve the
formulated game. Note that the equilibrium strategies should
satisfy (26) irrespective of the type of the solution.
Note that, the proposed Stackelberg solution is based on
the assumption of complete information, i.e., both players
have full information about their opponent’s. This assumption
should hold true for a powerful attacker that can accurately
observe the drones. For the defender, it is assumed that the
defender knows the attacker’s desired destinations and, hence,
can determine the attacker’s reaction set in advance according
to its role as a leader in the Stackelberg leader-follower sce-
nario. To gain this information, one approach for the defender
is to perform reconnaissance before launching the UAVs.
Another practical solution is to observe the attacker’s actions
and to use machine learning, e.g., reinforcement learning to
update its information about the UAVs’ deviated routes under
attack, and, hence, the directions of the attacker’s desired
destinations. However, this will require separate analysis and,
hence, is left for future work. Here, we handle the incomplete
information case for the defender when it cannot observe the
attacker’s actions. In this case, the defender might not be able
to achieve the same outcome as a Stackelberg solution, based
on the available information. Therefore, the defender can apply
non-game-theoretic strategy selection techniques as discussed
in the simulation results in Section V.
In our formulated game, the cost functions in (22) and (23)
will ensure the existence of the Stackelberg solution, under
closed-loop perfect information [35]. However, this solution
might not be unique, as there might be multiple strategies that
yield the same utilities for the players. Solving for closed-
loop strategies, in general, is challenging, especially when the
number of time steps is large. In the formulated game, the
number of available actions for each player, at every time step,
equals 5 which is the number of the UAVs. As a strategy is a
combination of τ different actions, there will be 5τ different
strategies available for each player. The solution follows by
calculating the attacker’s response for each of 5τ different
defender’s strategies, which involves testing all the attacker’s
5τ strategies per a defender’s strategy. Finally, the defender
selects the pair of strategies that minimize its utility. The
complexity of this solution approach will then be O(52τ ),
which is exponential in terms of the number of time steps.
This, in fact, might not be feasible when the value of τ is
large, as is the case in the UAVs’ traveling model. To this
end, we propose a computationally efficient solution of the
game as shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 2. The solution of the closed-loop dynamic Stack-
elberg game Ξ is equivalent to solving the static Stackelberg
equilibrium at each individual time step.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix B. 
From Theorem 2, we can infer that the complexity of
obtaining the solution will be reduced to determining the
attacker’s response and the defender’s Stackelberg action at
each time step. Thus, the complexity of the game will be
reduced to O(52τ), which is linear in terms of the number
of time steps. Note that, as discussed earlier, the solution of
the formulated game is non-unique. Theorem 2 will then allow
obtaining one of the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For our simulations, we consider the case of one GPS
spoofer and one group of five UAVs to better highlight the
outcome of the dynamic game. The analysis will can apply
to multiple groups of UAVs with an expected better outcome
for the UAVs due to the decreased probability of attacking a
single UAV.
First, in Fig. 5, we show a visual output of the proposed
game. The UAVs’ starting locations, real destinations, and the
attacker’s desired destinations are all shown in this figure. The
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Fig. 5: UAVs routes under no attack, no defense, and under the proposed Stackelberg game solution.
points Ai, i = 1, . . . , 5 are the attacker’s desired destinations
for each UAV and the points Di, i = 1, . . . , 5 are the real
destinations for each UAV. The UAVs update their locations
every 50 meters and the value of emax is assumed to be 50 m
as well. Note that the maximum value of emax that keeps the
attack covert depends on the fault detector used within the
UAV [28] and it can range from few meters up to 90 m for
different detector settings.
Fig. 5 shows the different routes that each UAV can follow.
The straight lines connecting each UAV’s starting point to its
destination, Di, represent the shortest paths that each UAV will
follow if there is no attack. These routes result from calculating
the UAVs’ locations according to (5) at each time step. On
the other hand, the routes from the UAVs’ starting points to
the attacker’s desired destinations, Ai, are the routes resulting
from following the attacker’s imposed locations at each time
step, i.e., the locations in (17). Note that, these routes, unlike
the shortest paths, are not straight lines as they are composed
of multiple short segments each of which is the UAV path
after perceiving the attacker’s imposed location. In some of
these paths, the attacker imposes multiple locations along the
path causing the route to deviate towards the attacker’s desired
destinations. The UAVs can follow these routes only if there
is an attack while the defense mechanism is not used. Finally,
Fig. 5 also shows the routes resulting from the proposed
Stackelberg game solution. These routes are bounded by the
previous two routes and may coincide with parts of these
routes. Every change in these routes represents a change in
the attacker’s response action, and, hence a change in the UAV
under attack. In the following, we will study how the routes
resulting from the Stackelberg game compare to the previous
two sets of routes, i.e., routes under no attack and routes under
attack while no defense is used.
Next, we study the effect of GPS spoofing attacks on the
UAVs’ traveling routes.
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Fig. 6: UAVs deviation index as a relation in the instance
drifted distance.
A. UAVs Deviation due to Spoofing Attacks
To study the attacker’s effect on the UAVs’ traveling routes,
we define a deviation metric, for each UAV, to compare the
UAV’s route resulting from the Stackelberg game with both the
no-attack route and the attack no-defense route shown in Fig.
5. Let xri (t) be UAV i’s location on the expected route under
no attack and let xfi (t) represent its locations on the attacker’s
desired route. We then define θi(t) to be the deviation of UAV
i at time step t given by:
θi(t) = 1−
∣∣∣∣∣∣xi(t)− xfi (t)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2∣∣∣∣∣∣xri (t)− xfi (t)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
, (27)
such that when a UAV is traveling on a no-attack route, the
value of θi(t) will equal 0. Similarly, if a UAV is traveling
on the attacker’s desired route, the value of θi(t) will equal 1.
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Fig. 7: UAVs deviation index as a relation in the update
distance.
Any other value in between the two routes, the value of θ will
be 0 < θ < 1. We can, then, define the deviation index Θi for
UAV i as the average of its deviation over all time steps. Note
that the deviation index can capture how far each UAV has
traveled from its planned route towards the attacker’s desired
route. However, a higher deviation index does not necessary
mean that this specific UAV will be captured by the attacker.
It merely means that the attacker has disrupted the UAV’s
original route.
In Fig. 6, we study the effect of the instance drifted distance,
emax, on the UAVs’ deviation indices. To better highlight the
effect of emax, we allowed the UAVs to update their locations
frequently by setting the update distance to 15 m. We notice
that, as emax increases, the attacker will be able to induce
bigger changes to the UAVs’ locations causing them to deviate
more from the planned routes hence increasing their deviation
index. For instance, when emax = 20 m, some of the UAVs
have almost zero deviation from their planned routes. On the
other hand, when emax = 90 m, most UAVs have a slight
deviation from their planned routes. We also note, from Fig.
6, that UAV 3, has much higher deviation than the other UAVs.
This happens as UAV 3 affects the attacker’s utility the most
while having a smaller effect on the defender’s utility. Thus,
UAV 3 is chosen by the attacker, at most time steps, as its
response action while the defender chooses other UAVs to
protect. Note that the players’ utilities, and, hence, their chosen
actions (UAVs) depend on the UAVs’ current locations and
both the real and the attacker’s desired destinations.
Next, we study the effect of the update distance, i.e., the
distance at which the UAVs apply the defense mechanism,
on the UAVs’ deviation indices. As the UAVs are traveling
using umax, the update distance will indicate the frequency of
updating the UAVs’ locations. In Fig. 7, we study different
update distances on the deviation index. In this case, we set
the value of emax to 60 m. From Fig. 7, we can see that, when
the update distance increases, i.e., the less frequent the UAVs
apply the defense mechanism, the more they deviate from
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Fig. 8: UAVs deviation index change due to shifting the
attacker’s desired destinations.
their planned routes. For instance, when the update distance
is set to 30 m, the average deviation index of all UAVs is
0.17 compared to 0.25 when the update distance is 100. This
happens as the UAVs will travel more towards the attacker’s
destinations before they update their locations, and, move
towards their real destinations. We also note that changing
the update distance can change the effect of the UAVs on the
players’ utilities, and, hence on their actions. For instance,
when the update distance is 40 m, UAV 2 is attacked more
than when the update distance is 30 m, and, hence, it has a
higher deviation index. For the same update values, UAV 3
has a lower deviation index when the update distance is 40 m
compared to when it is 30 m.
Next, we study the effect of changing the attacker’s desired
destinations on the UAVs’ deviation indices. In this case, we
use the same parameters as in Fig. 5. Different attacker’s
desired destinations, Ai, i = 1, . . . , 5, are tested by reducing
the distance between the attacker’s desired destination and
the real destinations randomly with an average change of 50
meters per UAV. In this case, the real destinations are fixed,
and the attacker’s desired destinations are shifted along the x
direction only allowing for deviations to take place along the
travel routes. Fig. 8 shows the effect of changing the attacker’s
desired destinations on the UAVs’ deviation indices. We can
see that, as the attacker’s desired destinations are closer to the
real destinations, the deviation index increases. For instance,
when the average distance between the attacker’s and the real
destinations is 550 m, the average deviation index for all UAVs
is 0.13 compared to 0.17 when the average distance drops to
200 m. This is because when the distances are smaller, the
attacker will have more opportunities (longer paths) to attack
the UAVs causing them to deviate more from their planned
routes. Note that, as the distances between the destinations are
allows to change randomly, the changes in UAVs’ distances
to the attacker’s desired destinations will not be constant.
Hence, the UAVs will contribute differently to the attacker’s
utilities with each change. This will cause the attacker’s actions
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(a) Stackelberg strategies
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(b) Random strategies
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(c) Deterministic strategies
Fig. 9: The effect of the instance drifted distance, emax, on the possibility of UAV capture.
(attacked UAVs) to be different over the travel routes, with
each change. For example, we can see in Fig. 8 that when
the distance is 300 m, UAV 2 is attacked more than when the
distance is 350 m. On the other hand, UAV 3 is less attacked
when the distance changes from 350 m to 300 m.
Finally, we note that, in all the previous cases, while the
three studied parameters affect the deviation index of the
UAVs, the update distance has the most effect on the UAVs’
deviation indices. This is because delaying the update will
allow the UAVs to travel on the attacked routes for longer
distances before correcting their locations leading to larger
deviations. Meanwhile, in the other scenarios, the attacker
caused a smaller average deviation on the UAVs because the
UAVs update their locations more frequently. These findings
corroborate the importance of the proposed defense mecha-
nism and provide important insights for the drone operator
to choose suitable update distances according to the available
resources.
Next, we study the attacker’s possibility to capture any of
the UAVs under GPS spoofing attacks.
B. Capturing Possibilities under GPS Spoofing Attacks
To study the capture possibility of the UAVs, we assume
the attacker needs to change a UAV’s route, by imposing
a different location, in order to capture it. We also assume
that the UAV will be captured if it reaches a distance emax
from the attacker’s desired destination. In the following, we
will compare our proposed Stackelberg solution with two
other non-game-theoretic baselines referred to as random
and deterministic approaches. In the random approach, the
defender chooses any UAV randomly to protect at each time
step. In the deterministic approach, the defender considers
all the UAVs, in order, by choosing one at each time step.
In all the three cases, the attacker chooses its strategies in
response to the defender’s chosen strategies. Note that the non-
game-theoretic strategies represent the defender’s possibilities
in case of incomplete information, i.e., when the defender
cannot observe the attacker’s actions and, hence cannot apply
the game-theoretic approach.
Fig. 9 shows the minimum distance that each UAV can
reach from its attacker’s desired destination, for each value
of emax. The shaded areas in Fig. 9 represent the distances
under which the UAV is considered to be captured which
correspond to having a distance less than emax to the attacker’s
desired destination. The configuration parameters in this case
are similar to Fig. 6. We can see in Fig. 9a that using the
Stackelberg strategies, the defender is able to protect all the
UAVs until emax = 60 m. When emax = 70 m and emax = 80 m,
both UAVs 1 and 5 can be captured by the attacker and when
emax = 90 m, UAV 4 can also be captured. In Fig. 9b, when
the drone operator uses random strategies, we can see that
the attacker is able to capture UAVs 1 and 5 starting from
emax = 60 m. Moreover, UAV 4 can be captured starting
from emax = 80 m. Under deterministic strategies, Fig. 9c,
the attacker is also able to start capturing UAVs 1 and 5
starting from emax = 60 m. It will be also able to capture
UAV 4 starting from emax = 80 m and to capture UAV 2 at
emax = 90 m.
It is clear from Fig. 9 that following the Stackelberg strate-
gies will help the defender to protect more UAVs, particularly
for higher values of emax. This is due to the fact that, under
Stackelberg strategies, the drone operator considers its utilities
based on the attacker’s response strategies which allows it to
mitigate the effect of the attacker’s expected actions. However,
the other approaches can still help the defender to utilize the
defense mechanism and protect the UAVs to some extent,
when the defender cannot observe the attacker’s actions and
use the game-theoretic approach. Fig. 9 also shows that
UAV 3 has the most changes to its minimum distance from
the attacker’s desired destination, when emax increases. This
corroborates the result of Fig. 6 whereby UAV 3 was the
most affected by the spoofer’s imposed locations, in terms of
deviation from its planned route. However, UAV 3 remains far
enough from being captured as the defender’s actions allow it
to return to the correct traveling direction.
Next, we study the effect of changing the UAVs’ update
distance on the possibility of UAV capture. The configura-
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Fig. 10: The effect of update distance on the possibility of UAV capture.
tion parameters in this case are similar to Fig. 7. Fig. 10
shows the effect of the capture possibility with the shaded
areas representing the distances under which the UAVs are
considered to be captured. We can see in Fig. 10a that using
the Stackelberg strategies, the drone operator is able to protect
all the UAVs until an update distance of 50m. The attacker is
able to capture its first UAV, UAV 5, when the update distance
is 60 m or 70 m. When the update distance is 80 m, three
UAVs can be captured by the attacker, and four UAVs can
be captured for update distances greater than 80 m. Under
random strategies, Fig. 10b shows that the attacker is able to
capture more UAVs when the update distance is 60 m as it
will capture UAVs 3 and 5. Similarly, for all the consequent
update distances, more UAVs can be captured compared to the
Stackelberg strategies. Under deterministic strategies, Fig. 10c
shows that the attacker will be able to start capturing UAVs
3 and 5 at an update distance of 60 m. When the update
distance is 70 m, the attacker will be able to capture three
UAVs compared to one in the Stackelberg strategies. For the
consequent update distances, the attacker is able to capture at
least the same number of UAVs as the Stackelberg strategies.
Next, we study the effect of changing the attacker’s desired
destinations on possibility of UAV capture. The configuration
parameters in this case are similar to Fig. 8, with emax = 60 m.
Fig. 11 shows this effect on the capture possibility. The shaded
areas in Fig. 11 represent the capture distances of the UAVs,
i.e., distances less than 60 m. We can see in Fig. 11a that using
the Stackelberg strategies, the drone operator is able to protect
all the UAVs when the average distance is 550 m. When the
average distance decreases to 500 m, the attacker will be able
to capture UAV 5. For any distances less than 400 m, the
attacker will be able to capture UAVs 1 and 5. Under random
strategies, Fig. 11b, we can see that the attacker is able to
capture UAVs 1 and 5 for all the considered distances. The
attacker will also be able to capture UAV 4 under multiple
distance settings. Finally, we can see in Fig. 11c, that the
deterministic strategies show very similar response to the
random strategies, in terms of the possibility of UAV capture.
Note that, from the three previous scenarios, we can see that
the update distance has the most effect on the possibility of
UAV capture, similar to its effect of the deviation index. This
highlights the importance of choosing this critical parameter
when applying the proposed defense mechanism.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel framework to
mitigate the effects of capture attacks via GPS spoofing that
target UAVs. Systems dynamics have been used to model the
UAVs’ optimal routes towards their destinations. To study
the effect of a GPS spoofer on these optimal routes, we
have mathematically derived the spoofer’s optimal imposed
locations on any UAV. These locations, when imposed on a
UAV, cause the UAVs to deviate from their planned routes and
follow new routes towards the spoofer’s desired destinations.
We have then proposed a countermeasure defense mechanism
to allow UAVs to determine their real locations, after being
attacked. This countermeasure is built on the premise of
cooperative localization, in which a UAV uses the locations
of nearby UAVs to determine its real location. We have, then,
defined a Stackelberg game problem to allow the UAVs to
better utilize the proposed defense mechanism. In particular,
the game is formulated between a GPS spoofer and a drone
operator that manages a number of UAVs. The drone operator
is considered the leader that determines its strategies first
and the spoofer then responds by choosing its strategies.
We have mathematically derived the Stackelberg equilibrium
strategies, for the formulated game, through a computationally
efficient approach. Results have shown that the proposed de-
fense mechanism along with Stackelberg equilibrium strategies
outperform other strategy selection techniques in terms of
reducing the possibility of UAV capture. We have also tested
the effect of different parameters on the UAVs’ deviation
indices and on the possibility of UAV capture and the results
have shown that the UAV update distance has the most effect
on these metrics. For future work, we will consider the case
of protecting groups of more than five UAVs against multiple
simultaneous GPS spoofing attacks.
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Fig. 11: The effect of the average distance between the real and the attacker’s desired destinations on the possibility of UAV
capture.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof. We start by making two assumptions. First, the UAV
is considered to reach its destination if it is within a distance
emax from its real destination. We also assume that the distance
between the UAV’s current location and its real destination is
greater than emax, i.e., the UAV did not reach its destination
yet.
According to (5) and (17), the UAV travels towards its real
destination from its perceived location. Therefore, in order for
the UAV to reach a destination in the opposite side from
its real destination, the UAV needs to change its direction
in the direction with the longest difference from the UAV’s
current location. Assume without loss of generality that the
difference in the x direction, between the UAV’s perceived
location and its real destination, is bigger than the difference
in the y direction. Then for the UAV, to change its x direction,
the value of uaxi(t) needs to flips its sign in (17). Comparing
the optimal controller, in x direction, in both (16) and (4) and
assuming they have opposite signs:
cos(arctan
( ydi − yˆi(t)
xdi − xˆi(t)
)
) = − cos(arctan
( ydi − yi(t)
xdi − xi(t)
)
)
For this condition to hold, xdi − xˆi(t) needs to have a
different sign from xdi − xi(t). i.e., xˆi(t) − xi(t) = (xdi −
xi(t)) + (xdi − xˆi(t))
However, under a covert attack, the imposed location is
limited by (6), i.e., |xˆi(t)−xi(t)| ≤ emax|. Since, it is assumed
that the UAV’s real location is more than emax away from its
real destination, i.e, xdi −xi(t) ≥ emax, then the condition for
changing the direction cannot hold. In this case, the attacker
cannot impose a location that forces the UAV to change
its x direction. Therefore, the attacker’s desired destination
cannot be in the opposite x direction from the UAV’s real
destination. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. We begin the proof by investigating the solution of the
closed-loop dynamic Stackelberg game which is the pair of
strategies from (25) that satisfy (26). Our proof will show that
the same reaction set in (25) can be achieved by considering
the solution of the static Stackelberg game at each time
step. Note that, the reaction set in (25) is a combination of
the attacker’s reactions to every single defender’s strategy
calculated from (24). In the following, we will show the
solution when τ = 2 and then generalize it to any number
of time steps.
When τ = 2, the attacker’s cost function in (22) can be
written as:
Ja(βd,βa) =
5∑
i=1
∥∥xadi − xi(∆, zdi (1), zai (1))∥∥22
+
5∑
i=1
∥∥xadi − xi(2∆, zdi (2), zai (2))∥∥22 . (28)
In the dynamic Stackelberg game, the attacker will select
a strategy βa = {zai (1), zai (2)} in response to every βd that
minimizes its utility. We can rewrite (28) by substituting the
values from (19):
Ja(βd,βa) =
5∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣xadi − (1− zai (1) + zdi (1) · zai (1)) · xi(∆)
− (zai (1)− zai (1) · zdi (1)) · xai (∆)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
+
5∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣xadi − (1− zai (2) + zdi (2) · zai (2)) · xi(2∆)
− (zai (2)− zai (2) · zdi (2)) · xai (2∆)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
.
(29)
Now, consider that the defender chooses a specific strategy
βd = {zdj (1) = 1, zdk(2) = 1} where j, k ∈ N . This means
in the first time step zdj (1) = 1 and all the remaining actions
will be be zero. Similarly, in the second time step zdk(2) = 1
and all the remaining actions will be be zero. The previous
cost function can then be written as:
Ja(βd,βa) =
5∑
i=1,i 6=j
∣∣∣∣∣∣xadi − (1− zai (1)) · xi(∆)− zai (1) · xai (∆)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
+
5∑
i=1,i 6=k
∣∣∣∣∣∣xadi − (1− zai (2)) · xi(2∆)− zai (2) · xai (2∆)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣xadj − xj(∆)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣xadk − xk(2∆)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
. (30)
Now consider the attacker’s response to βd = {zdj (1) =
1, zdk(2) = 1}. Let βa = {zam(1) = 1, Zan(2) = 1} where
m,n ∈ N is the attacker’s response that achieves the minimum
cost in (24). Similar to the defender’s actions, in this case
zam(1) = 1 and z
a
n(1) = 1 and all the other attacker’s actions
will be zero. Now, rewrite the cost in (30) with respect to
βa = {zam(1) = 1, zan(2) = 1}:
Ja(βd,βa) =
5∑
i=1,i 6=m,n
2∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣xadi − xi(t∆)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣xadm − xam(∆)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣xadm − xm(2∆)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣xadn − xn(∆)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣xadn − xan(2∆)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
2
. (31)
As the cost in (31) represents the minimum cost in response
to βa = {zam(1) = 1, zan(2) = 1}, the attacker cannot achieve
a better cost by changing its strategy. This minimum cost was
achieved by attacking UAV m, at the first time step without
affecting the other UAVs, and attacking UAV n, on the second
time step, without affecting the other UAVs. This is because
the attacker affects only one UAV, at a time step, and the
remaining UAVs travel towards their real destinations. Note
that, the attacker’s choice at the second time step, i.e, UAV
n is independent from its choice at the first time step. After
the first time step, UAV n reached its real destination, and
yet, this was the best for the attacker at the second time step.
Since the action at the second time step is independent from
the action at the first time step and it depends only on the
new UAVs’ locations after the first time step, the attacker will
have the same reaction set if faced by the defender’s actions
sequentially instead of the whole strategy.
This finding can be extended to any number of time steps as
the attacker’s action, at a time step, will affect only one UAV
and its actions in the following time steps will be based on the
new UAVs’ locations whether they were attacked or not at the
previous time step. In other words, when faced by a strategy,
the attacker cannot achieve a better outcome than responding
at each time step independently. Considering this fact, the
defender can determine the reaction set in (25) sequentially
by solving each time step individually. After determining
the complete reaction set, the Stackelberg strategies can be
achieved from (26).

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